Share prices and ownership variables : a cross-sectional and temporal analysis by Hevas, Dimosthenis et al.
European Research Studies 
Volume VI, Issue (3-4), 2003 , pp. 163-176 
Share Prices and Ownership Variables: 
A Cross-Sectional and Temporal Analysis 
Dimosthenis Hevasl, 
George Karathanassis2 
Nikolaos Philippas3 
Abstract 
We investigate the relation between share prices and the proportion of equity held by 
institutional investors for a sample of 52 companies quoted on the Athens Stock Exchange 
over the period from} 991 to 1996. We differ from earlier studies in as milch as use is made 
of a) an explicit share valuation model a nd b) temporal and cross-sectional analysis. 
We find no significant relationship between share prices and institutional holdings. 
Tentatively, we conclude that institutional investors do not see themselves as part of the 
decision making team in which they have a stake. 
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1. Introduction 
In financial economics share prices depend on company profitability and risk. 
Any other variable, if important in its own right, should, in efficient markets, be 
priced away and thus reflected in the level of share prices. 
Many have, however, maintained that a number of financial relationships 
cannot be explained only by financial theoretical constructs. Perspectives from 
other academic disciplines can shed light on the way various company decisions 
are being made. 
In this paper we will investigate the relationship between share prices and in-
stitutional ownership of companies quoted on the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE). 
Specifically, we will investigate the association between share prices and the pro-
portion of equity capital held by institutional investors. Since both the dependent 
and independent variables are affected by third variables, we will allow for their 
effect by explicitly introducing them into the statistica l model. In previous studies 
(using effectively implicit valuation models) the importance of the so-called control 
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variables is identified separately and not simultaneously with the importance of 
other variables. This approach, however, can lead to mis-specified models and to 
spurious results. For example, although earnings, dividends, retained earnings and 
book value variables have been identified by researchers as being very important 
in the determination of share values and/or market returns, regressions are usu-
ally run on performance measures and equity ownership. Thiis approach may yield 
spurious empirical relationships. 
For our basic valuation models we will utilise a recent theoretical framework 
developed by Ohlson (1989, 1995). This model is essentially similar to the valuation 
model developed by Miller and Modigliani (1961). In addition, examining the issue 
of institutional ownership explicitly within an empirical valuation framework, we will 
depart from previous work with respect to the statistical analysis used. Specifically, 
we will observe a given num ber of firms for six years and apply a generalised least 
squares technique to combined cross-sectional and temporal obselvations. 
The remainder of the paper is divided into five sections. In section 2 we re-
view the theoretical and empirical relationships between corporate value and the 
structure of share ownership. In section 3 we set out the valuation model under 
investigation. Section 4 is devoted to a description of the data and to explaining 
some of the fundamentals of pooling cross-section and time-series data. Section 5 
presents the results while section 6 discusses the results and concludes the paper. 
2. Theoritical Framework 
2.1 Structure of Share Ownership 
A basic assumption which permeates the heart of finance theory is the max-
imisation of share prices. This is achieved if management accepts all investment 
projects that increase shareholder wealth. Implicit in this assumption is that man-
agement always acts in shareholders best interests. Within thi:; decision framework 
all shareholders are viewed as a fairly homogeneous group, not actively involved 
in the running of the company. Essentially under this view shareholders exercise 
their control over management by voting with their dollars. Under this regime 
the distribution of shares among management, institutions, blockholders and in-
dividual shareholders does not influence company performance. Influences upon 
management actions emanate from the rnanageriallabour market and competition 
among companies (Fama 1980) and the threat from outside takeovers (Martin and 
McConnell 1990).4 
1bere has, however, been argued that the distribution of share ownership among 
managers and outsiders can influ~nce the performance of companies. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) distinguish between inside shareholders who manage the company 
and outside shareholders. Managers manage the company affairs in their own self 
interests which may not coincide with those of outside shareholders. Managers 
who do not own shares tend to act in their own interests adopting investment and 
Further, within an efficient market theory framework there should be no difference between the vari-
ous groups of shareholders since all have the same common objective of maximising share values. 
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financing policies that benefit them but not the company shareholders_ However, as 
management share ownership increases their financial interests will coincide with 
those of outside shareholders (Morek et al. 1988). Others (in addition to Jensen 
and Meckling 1976) view the company as a set of contracts among factors of pro-
duction (Alchian and Demsetz 1972). In other words, the company is thought of as 
a team the members of which pursuc their own different interests but realise that 
the final outcome depends on the survival of the company (team) in its competi-
tion with other companies (teams). Further, Demsetz (1983) views the ownership 
structure from a managerial perspective arguing that the ownership structure that 
emerges in a company, at a point in time, is determined within the company as 
an endogenous equilibrium outcome. Demsetz concludes that there is no ex-ante 
relation between ownership structure and company performance_ Effectively, the 
central idea behind these studies is that the modern corporation may be viewed 
as a coalition of various groups (managers, individual shareholders, trade unions, 
institutions, debtholders, etc). Each group, in an effort to protect its own interests, 
monitors the management of the firm. The managers are viewed as a separate group 
with its own interests which may be different, in part or in total, from those of the 
other interested parties. For example, debtholders (banks or major bondholders) 
may press for the acceptance of less risky investment projects, shareholders may 
press for long-term performance, institutions may be interested in short-term re-
sults while management may be interested in the rate of growth of sales. The final 
outcome of this conflict of interest will depend on the strength of the incentives 
of each group and the financial capacity to undertake the agency costs involved in 
this endeavour. Further, the legal environment can also be a restrictive factor for 
a close monitoring of the behaviour of management. 
2.2 The Role of Institutional Investors 
A number of authors centered their attention on the influence of institutional 
shareholders on corporate value. 
The relationship between value and institutional shareholdings is by no means 
straightforward . On the one hand, institutional investors, acting as long-term 
sharcholders are expected to be actively involved in monitoring the performance 
of companies in which they invest their funds. If this regime prevails, institutional 
shareholders should be expected to be involved in the daily management of the 
company, monitoring its management for effective control. Such an involvement, 
though, may hinder their ability to react to bad news about the performance of 
the company since they cannot, for legal reasons, react to exploit valuable inside 
information. Further, as agency costs are quite high, profitable use of funds for 
the monitoring of management behaviour entails a fairly large investment in the 
company's shares. Such investment behaviour limits the powers of diversification 
and exposes the institution to a high degree of specific risk. High risk exposure and 
the wish to exploit even small share price increases compels institutional manag-
ers to act as if they were short-term traders. As Scherer (1980) has pointed out, 
institutional managers take short-term investment decisions since they themselves 
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are constantly being appraised. These views lead one to expect ex-ante a negative 
relationship between corporate value and institutional shareholding. In addition, 
we should expect volatile share prices for those companies the shares of which 
are frequently being traded for short term gains. Many academics maintain that 
institutional investors behave as short-term traders avoiding the close monitoring 
of management (Hirschman, 1970; Drucker, 1976; and, Hutton, 1995). 
Pound (1988) advanced three hypotheses in order to explain the attitudes of 
institutional investors and their willingness to participate in the governance of 
the company. According to the first hypothesis (efficient monitoring hypothesis) , 
institutional investors and large blockholders, unlike small shareholders, find it 
cost effective to monitor management behaviour. The monitoring of manage-
ment actions compels the high echelon of management hierarchy into adopting 
value maximising policies. In addition, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that large 
blockholders, through various monitoring devices and using the threat of takeovers 
compels management to being alert to possible raiders both from inside (large 
monitoring interests) and outside the company. These arguments would predict a 
positive relationship between corporate value and the presence of large monitor-
ing interests. According to the second hypothesis, it may be to the advantage of 
institutional investors to cooperate with management on specific matters (strategic 
alliance hypothesis). According to the conflict of interests hypothesis, Pound's 
third hypothesis, institutional investors may ally with managers because of various 
relationships that have developed with management. A change in management 
may endanger these relationships. According to the last two hypotheses, we should 
expect a negative association between the value of the company and the size of 
institutional shareholdings. 
2.3 :Earlier Results 
From our exposition thus far it has become evident that the association between 
corporate value and the size of institutional shareholding cannot be settled on theo-
retical grounds. In effect, it is an empirical issue and only by resorting to empirical 
testing would we be able to determine the magnitude and the sign of the association 
between value and the structure of share ownership. Most of the empirical work 
emanates from the USA and the remainder from the UK. We should also mention 
work from Germany and France. Pound (1988) provided evidence on the role played 
by institutional investors in monitoring a company's management. His study of proxy 
contests suggests that there is a negative relationship between value and the size of 
institutional shareholding lending thus credence to the conflict of interest/strategic 
alliance hypotheses. Graves (1988) also reported a negative relationship between 
R&D expenditure and the size of institutional shareholders which he considered as 
evidence that the institutional shareholders are much more interested in a company's 
short-term than in the long-term performance. Hansen and IIill (1991), however, 
using a different sample found a positive association between the same variables. 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) reported a strong positive association between To-
bin's Q and the proportion of shares held by institutional investors. These results 
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are in line with the conclusion of the efficient monitoring hypothesis. Chaganti and 
Damanpour (1991) reported that company capital structure and return on equity 
is significantly related to the size of institutional shareholdings. Higher levels of 
institutional shareholdings are related to low gearing ratios and high equity returns 
while higher levels of family ownership correspond to higher gearing ratios. On the 
other hand, Short and Keasey (1997) found that directors shareholdings or other 
ownership interests have no influence on the performance of the company. Similar 
conclusions were reached by Holderness and Sheehan (1988) who analysed two 
samples, one with shareholders owning more than 50% of the company's shares and 
one in which no shareholders owned more than 20% of the shares. They reported no 
significant difference between the two samples for Tobin's Q ratio and accounting 
profits. Further evidence on the irrelevance of large shareholders and corporate 
value was provided by Hermalin and Weisback (1987), Morck et a1. (1988) and 
Murali and Welch (1989). For the UK, in addition to Short and Keasey mentioned 
earlier, empirical studies found ownership controlled firms had higher profits but 
the effect was either small or statistically insignificant (Radice, 1971; Holl, 1975; 
Steer and Cable, 1978; and, Cubbin and Leech, 1986). More recent work, however, 
using large companies, reported that ownership control is associated with higher 
valuation ratios, pro:fit margins, return on equity and growth rates on sales and net 
assets (Leech and Leahy, 1991). 
For France, Jacquermin and De Ghellinck (1980) divided companies between 
majority and minority controlled and between familial and non-familial controlled 
companies. Their dependent variable under examination was a hybrid measure of 
return on net worth (net cash flow divided by book value of equity and reserves) . 
Their results showed that there was no significant difference between majority 
controlled and minority controlled companies. They reported also significant results 
between familial and non-familial controlled companies. For Germany, Thonet 
and Poensgen (1979) examined the influence of management control and owner 
controlled firms on various performance measures (return on equity, market rate 
of return, market value to book value and growth of total assets) and found that 
management controlled firms had significant higher return on equity and market 
values while owner controlled firms had higher growth in total assets. 
As with all valuation type models, the results are mixed. The studies that have 
been undertaken in order to investigate such important issues provide conflicting 
results regarding the relationship between various company performance measures 
and ownership structure. Since these issues have important implications for port-
folio management and market efficiency, new tests using data from various parts 
of the world are called forth. For it is only through repeated testings of various 
theoretical constructs that we should feel comfortable with the relevance of these 
constructs to real world phenomena. 
3. Share Valuation Models 
According to Ohlson (1989, 1995), under clean surplus accounting and assuming 
that the time series behaviour of abnormal accounting earnings satisfies a certain 
stochastic process, a firm 's market value is determined as follows: 
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(1) 
where 
MVt : is the market value of the equity for period t; 
A t" : are the abnormal accounting earnings for period t; 
EQt : is the book value of equity for period t; 
[lI;] : is a vector that contains all other non- accounting value relevant variables 
not yet affecting At and EQt. 
For the purposes of our analysis, we will assume that the ownership variables 
are included in the [Vel and consequently we will be testing the following version 
of Ohlson's model: 
(2) 
where 
p, : is the common stock price six months after the end of fiscal year t; 
A t" : the abnormal accounting earnings per common stock attributed to the 
shareholders for period t, defined as A t" = A t - RfEQt-j; 
At : the accounting earnings p~:r common stock attributed to the shareholders 
for period t; 
EQI : the book value of equity per common stock at the end of period t; 
Rf : the risk free rate of return in the beginning of period t; 
POI : the percentage of shares held by investment trusts and mutual funds; 
4. The Sample 
4.1 Sample Description and Data Sources 
The sample includes all firms listed on the Athens Stock Exchange for which 
all relevant ownership information were available for a six year period from 1991 
to 1996 inclusive. Given clata availability we were able to have relevant ownership 
data for 59 firms for the entire period mentioned above. Accounting and stock 
market data were taken from the «EFFECT» database, the portfolios of the mutual 
funds and investment companies were obtained from the data base of the journal 
«MONEY» (XPHMi~) while the risk free rate of returns were extracted from Bank 
of Greece's relevant publications. 
4.2 Definition of Variables 
For the purpose of testing empirically the model described by equation (2) the 
dependent and independent variables included in it are defined as follows: 
Pt is the common stock price six months after the end of fiscal year t. 
At is the accounting earnings per share for period t. 
At" represents abnormal accounting earnings per share for period t, that is 
At" = A, - RfEQt- l . At" could alternatively be defined as pure profits, it being 
the difference between earnings per share (At) minus the opportunity cost 
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of these earnings (RfEQt-l), according to Ohlson (1989,1995) and Feltham 
and Ohlson (1995) contributions. 
EQt represents the book value of equity per share for period t. 
Rf is the annual rate of return on one year govern ment bills at the beginning of 
period t. 
POt represents the percentage of shares held by investment trusts and mutual 
funds . 
Application of the diagnostic tests suggested by Belsley et al. (1980) detected 
the presence of seven influential outliers and as a result, our sample was reduced 
to 52 firms. 
Initially, we present results (Table 1) for our sample of 52 firms observed for 
1991 to 1996. We, thus, ran six (6) separate cross-sectional regressions. As we 
mention in our methodology (in the next paragraphs of this section) we also ran a 
regression on the combined set of cross-section and time-series data using all 312 
available observations. In order to combine time-series and cross-sections data we 
applied Chow's (1960) homogeneity test both to our initial sample of 59 firms and 
to our reduced sample of 52 firms. The Chow statistic showed non-homogeneity 
of data for the first sample and homogeneity for the second sample of 52 firms. 
Consequently, our sample for pooling as with our cross-sectional analysis will 
consist of 52 firms. 
4.3 Choise Between Cross-Sectional and Temporal Analysis 
Given the nature of our data, i.e. fifty two (52) shares over a six (6) year period, 
we have two choises. We can either conduct a purely cross-sectional or a cross-
sectional and temporal analysis. In a cross-sectional analysis we are concerned with 
deriving information from quantifiable dependent and independent variables at 
a point in time. NOll-quantifiable variables, that is intra-firm variables, cannot be 
ascertained. If intra-firm variation cannot be measured, its effect must be allowed 
for statistically. A way for overcoming these problems is to combine cross-section 
and time-series data. 
4.4 Pooling of Cross-Section and Time-Sc'ries Data 
The estimation of functions that combine time-series and cross-section data is 
an occurence common enough in empirical business research. Usually we observe 
a number of companies, households, individuals etc. over a number of years. The 
combination of time-series and cross-section data offers researchers a significant 
number of degrees of freedom which allows them to overcome the constraints of 
the assumptions of the classical least square regression model. Perhaps, the most 
serious underlying a:,sumption is that both the slope coefficient and the intercept are 
fixed and identical from observation to obselvation. This assumption is violated since 
individuals are likely to differ in their response to some economic or other stimuli. 
The common approach is the introduction of unobservable cross-section and 
time effects. The introduction of all these variables allows one to capture all those 
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important individual or time effects which affect the dependent variable but which 
cannot be measured explicitly. 
Furthermore, the introduction of these effects helps to reduce the degree of 
autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity. 
Algebrically, the relationship may be written as follows: 
Y;I = a + L f3kXkit + fit 
(i = 1,2, ... , Nand t == 1,2, ... , 1) 
where 
fit = f.1i + AI + WiI; 
Y il is the dependent variable; 
XiI is the k + h non-stochastic explanatory variable; 
(3) 
f.1i is the unobservable cross-sectional effect which is invariant over time but differs 
among cross-sections; 
At is the unobservable time effect, which is constant among cross-sections but 
differs over time; 
Wit is the unobservable remainder effect, which differs both across time and among 
cross-sections. 
The parameter of the above specification can be estimated making a number 
of different assumptions regarding the nature of the stochastic term fil. These as-
sumptions, used widely in applied research are: 
Assumption 1: The terms f.1i and AI are unknown constants while the term Wit is a 
random variable. 
Assumption 2: All the terms mentioned above are random variables. 
The first assumption leads to the dummy variable modd while the second leads 
to the error components model.6 
With the dummy variable model the resulting estimates will be unbiased and 
consistent, but will not be the most efficient in comparison with other estimating 
techniques. Another disadvantage of this is the use of a significant number of de-
grees of freedom. Further, application of this approach eliminates a large amount 
of the variation among both the explained and the explanatory variables when the 
variation between cross-sections and between time periods is large.7 
Furthermore, it is extremely difficult to attach a sound economic meaning to 
the dummy variables. Finally, this approach is especially sensitive to possible er-
rors in variables.8 
TIle well known covariance analysis, which in the past had been used extensively in the area of 
production funcrtion. See Mlilldlak (1963) and Hock (1962)_ 
For a number of variations of the error components model see, Balestra and Nerlove (1966), Wal-
lace and Hussain (1969), Chamberlain and Griliches (1975), Lilliard and Willis (1978), Lillard and 
Weiss (1979), Hausman and Taylor (1981) 
Madclala (1971)_ 
MUlldlack (1978) and Hausman and Taylor (1981) 
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The above problems may be overcome using a specification that treats the ~li 
and At as random variables. 
With this approach the relationship may be written as: 
lit = a + L {3kXkit + f it 
(i = 1, 2, ... , Nand t = 1,2, ... , T) 
where 
(4) 
(5) 
In equation (5) the total random effect fit consists of three random effects, 
the first accounting for firm effects, the second for time effects and the third is an 
overall cross-section and time-series effect. 
The estimation of the coefficients involves the use of a modified Aitken pro-
cedure consisting of two stages.9 In the first stage the estimates of the variance of 
the error components may be obtained using least squares with dummy variables, 
while in the second one could use the generalised least squares estimator: 
B =: (X'Q·1Xy1X'Q.ly 
In this paper we present results both from pure cross-sectional and temporal 
cross-sectional analysis. 
5. Presentation of Results 
5.1 Results from Cross-Section Analysis 
Our relationship under examination specifies that differences in share prices 
across firms and over time can be explained by differences across firms and over time 
in abnormal earnings per share, book value per share and institutional holdings. 
Table 1: Model: Pt = ao + alAI" + azEQt + a3POt, Cross-Section Analysis with OLS. 
(n = 52) 
Year ao al a 2 a3 Rz-Adj F 
1991 387.152 4.660 1.823 - 799.124 0.6367 30.80* 
(1.72)*** (5.94)* (6.97)' (- 0.53) 
~y-.-.~~-y----------.----"- -.----.-.. ~-... _"·_''' __ YY __ Y'_~ ______ '_'··~''~···~' ••• _"._"'_'"_ .. _."_ 
1992 405.997 4.189 1.373 -1524.39 0.7652 56.40' 
(8.74)* 
1993 684.351 3.738 1.442 -2370.809 0.6229 29.09* 
1994 696.506 3.785 1.109 - 1454.708 0.7506 52.18* 
(-1.15) 
Amcmiya (1971). 
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1995 286,789 L459 
1996 563.068 4.416 
*. at a = 0.01 (two tail test); **: 
at a =, 0.10 (two tail test). 
Definition of Variables: 
0.972 
(5.38)* 
0.903 
6192.958 
630.227 
0.3797 11.41 * 
0.5419 21.11 * 
Pt: the common stock price six monlhs after the end of fiscal year I; A t: the accounting earnings per 
common stock attributed to til e shareholders for period t; At": the abnormal earnings 
per common stock apportioned jiJr the shareholders for period t defined as At', = At - RjEQt-l; 
EQt: the book value of equity per common stock for period t; POt: the percentage of shares held 
by ifll'eslmenl tn/sts and Rf.' the risk free rate at the beginning of period t. 
Our cross-sectional results appear in Table 1. The t-ratios of the estimates, that 
appear in parentheses, were all corrected for heteroscedasticity using White's (1980) 
consistent covariance matrix. In all years the overall significance of the equations 
and their explanatory power are satisfactory. The two main independent variables 
that according to theory should determine value have the elipected positive sign 
and are statistically significant. 
With regard to the influence of institutional holdings the results are mixed. The 
results for 1991 to 1994 suggest a weak negative relationship. For 1995 we observe 
a positive and statistically significant result and for year 1996 the relationship is 
positive but statistically insignificant. 
Overall, we could say that there has not been significant influence on the part 
of the Greek institutions on share prices for the period 1991 to 1996. 
5.2 Results from GeneraHised Least Squares. Time-Series and Cross-Sectional 
Data 
The results from the combined sample of 312 observations are shown in Table 2. 
TabHe 2: Model: Pt = ao + alAta + a£Qt + a3POt, Cross-Section and Time-Series 
Analysis with G.L.S. (n = 312) 
Years ao 
1991-1996 987.10 2.55 0.59 -213.90 0.801 
*: significant at a = 0.01 (two tail test); **: significant at a == 0.05 (two tail test); ***: 
at a = 0.10 (two tail test). 
Definltioll of Variables: 
Pt: the common stock price six months after the end of fiscal year t; At: the HLL,vn",u", 
F 
common stock attributed to the shareholders jClr period t; A(,; the abnormal accounting earnings 
per common stock apportioned jiJr the shareholders for period t defined as A t" = At - RrEQt-l; 
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EQt: the book value of equity per common stock for period t; PO,: the percentage of shares held 
by investment trusts and mutual f unds; R/ the risk free rate at the beginning of period t. 
Our relationship under examination specifies that differences in share prices 
across firms and over time are functionally related to differences across firms and 
over time to abnormal earnings per share, book values per share and the propor-
tion of institutional holdings. 
The R 2 value is quite high. The abnormal earnings coefficient appears to exert 
significant positive (and statistically significant) influence on share prices. The same 
comment applies to book value of equity per share. Once more our institutional 
holdings variable bears no relationship with the independent variable. 
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
We set out to investigate whether institutional holdings exert an independent 
influence on share prices. We used data from companies quoted on the Athens 
Stock Exchange, a market which for some is considered to be emerging whereas 
for others is already considered to be a fledged stock market. 
As to our main variable of interest, institutional holdings, the results taken at face 
value show that institutional investors are neither short-sighted nor long-sighted. 
Apparently, their experts analyse company fundamentals and act accordingly. Value 
is determined not by the presence of institutional holdings in the ownershiop struc-
ture of the company but by company expressed results. 
Overall, therefore, our results agree with trandiotional efficient markets theory. 
We should disregard the negative but (statistically) almost non existent relationship 
between value and institutional shareholdings. Had it been statistically significan t 
we could argue for the relevance of the myopic institutional theory. It is important 
to take into account the fact that Greece top management is controlled by major 
shareholders who manage their company along the lines suggested by the profit 
maximisation postulate. Within this framework, institutional shareholders are likely 
to be passive investors relying on management policies for the eventual maximisa-
tion of their portfolio holdings. 
It is obvious that more work is required on the important subject of the own-
ership structure and its influence (if any) on share prices. Better research design 
studies are clearly required. We should remember that by performance within a 
share valuation framework we mean expected performance. Yet, in virtually all 
empirical valuation models researchers investigate the relationship between ex-post 
values for the dependent and independent variables. It is not sufficient to maintain 
that expectations are realised within a five··year period, or within a ten-year period 
etc. It is extremely important to study market expectations processes. Without such 
studies, it would not be possiblc to determine the extent to which corporate govern·· 
ment variables affect share prices, capital structure decisions, dividend payouts, 
investment decision and other important decision variables. Nevertheless, the inter-
disciplinary approach linking organisational, managerial and finance perspectives 
is of paramount importance in that there is already sufficient evidence to allow us 
to argue convincingly that finance theory cannot alone wholy explain such crucial 
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matters as share price formation, capital structure determination, dividend policy 
considerations and various other seemingly financial matters. 
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